The quotations below are taken directly from proceedings and submissions in cases handled by our office.

"It is extraordinary, by any reasonable measure, when the deprivation of liberty hangs upon images in the mind of a complainant, inexplicably absent for approximately 20 years, their appearance indisputably informed by, and consistent with, images and narratives being widely portrayed in a media frenzy. Add that in the solitude of his private journal the Complainant at bar initially declared unequivocal uncertainty, and thereby confirmed his own inability, to decipher whether the images in his mind were just thoughts that he was thinking, or "memories" of actual events.  Add that the evidence at trial did not corroborate what the Complainant would over time adopt with utmost confidence to be 'memories.' In fact, the evidence would establish fundamental and irresolvable conflict." 

"The issue before this Court is not merely of an evidentiary character. It is an issue that drives to the very core of our criminal justice system. The payment of money to fact witnesses in exchange for testimony in a criminal case, those payments conditioned upon outcome, is utterly offensive to the fair administration of justice. It is a practice that undermines determinations of guilt, brings the integrity of our courts into disrepute, and sews the seeds of corrupting influence. The fact of its occurrence at bar -- facilitated by a prosecutor who understood he was acting to acquire conditional compensation for witnesses favorable to the government, knowing that the incentive for future compensation upon achieving desires results would exert pressure upon those witnesses -- represents a troubling loss of perspective. As a citizen who is entitled to meaningful due process of law, who is protected by a presumption of innocence no matter the charges at issue, the Defendant asserts that he cannot properly be condemned by judgments that arose out of, and remain inextricably linked to, a tainted and corrupt process. It is not possible to affirm such judgments without affirming, or excusing, the process that produced them. Whatever standard of review is ultimately applied, and whatever the precise contours of the remedy, the judgments should, at a minimum, be reversed. The Defendant is a son of this Commonwealth, no matter the allegations against him. A judicial process that paid witnesses for successfully condemning him is an outrage. No rationale can excuse what occurred in this case, or reasonably preserve the result. This Honorable Court, as a guardian of fundamental fairness, should not permit the judgments to stand."
 

"It was egregious error for the trial judge to have denied Mr. Pittman's well founded request for a short continuance in order to present the critical testimony of Ms. Greer. No citizen, accused of serious crimes and presumed to be innocent, should be deprived of the fundamental right to present evidence of such immense significance because the trial judge speculated, without ever bothering to confirm, anticipated juror dissatisfaction with a short delay. This Court should not permit a right so fundamental to the whole concept of due process to be so limited. Mr. Pittman, as any citizen, is entitled to more. On this ground alone and in the interest of justice, his convictions should not stand. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV; Mass. Const., art. 12."

"When a citizen stands accused of a crime and must confront the authority and power of the State, he should, at the very least, be guaranteed the opportunity to face evidence, as opposed to unverifiable suggestion interjected by the State. Here, the Commonwealth presented no evidence to show a motive for the shooting, nor evidence of any activity leading up to the incident which connected Mr. Wynter to the shooting. Rather, the fact finders were told--through impermissible, leading questions put to the defendant--about alleged events which supposedly gave rise to motive and a shooting, by insinuation, unfairly casting upon Mr. Wynter the impossible burden of somehow fending against it."

"The central question is whether the statute, when read as a whole, reaches too far by use of language that will inevitably require judgments too subjective and idiosyncratic, impinging upon areas of common pursuit and interest, such as the arts, outside the realm of easily identifiable illegal pornography. … When determination of legality versus illegality ventures into the realm of variant but valid individual perspectives, without the substantial consistency that derives from clear and objective standards, constitutional problems are unavoidable. … Debate about the value and merit of artistic projects like the movie Hounddog should remain just that: a debate about value and merit, not a question of whether those involved in producing a film can be prosecuted as “accessories to a crime.” When the subject matter within a criminal statute’s scope ventures into the realm of such a debate, when it can be used as a tool to validate the perspective of one side of such a debate, it is simply too broad and should not be allowed to stand."

"The Commonwealth describes the argument in the brief of Mr. Stuckich as “a multi-pronged assault on the prosecutor.” Mr. Stuckich would describe it differently. He would describe it as an argument in favor of the constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness. He would describe it as an argument in favor of criminal proceedings that reflect the integrity inherent in maintaining a focus on the search for truth, without devolving into character attacks, cognizant of the solemnity and gravity of a process by which a person’s liberty, reputation and livelihood will be determined."

"To deny Mr. West’s appellate claims on grounds that he is at fault for not providing an adequate appellate record would endorse a system of justice that at once deprives him of an opportunity to elicit evidence and then penalizes him for what he does not say. This is so contrary to fairness, so repugnant to the traditions of fairness in a modern society such as ours, that acceptance of the Commonwealth’s argument regarding an inadequate record would not only defy common sense, but would comprise an obvious violation of due process. U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV; Mass. Const. art 12."

"As a member of the State Bar of California, Defendant-Lawyer was granted the privileges and duties of a fiduciary. Defendant-Lawyer owed duties of the highest character: undivided loyalty and fidelity, the most scrupulous good faith, honesty and integrity. The evidence in this case will establish that Defendant-Lawyer was negligent, that he desired to conceal that negligence, and that this desire gave birth to fraudulent, deceptive conduct. ...

"The burden and inconvenience to D.P.H. were it forced to defend itself in a California court are readily apparent.  D.P.H. is a small, non-profit, 183 bed, community hospital operating locally in Ponce, Puerto Rico. Documents, physical evidence and Spanish speaking witnesses, all of which are located in Puerto Rico, make California an inconvenient forum. It would be extremely burdensome, prohibitively expensive, and extremely inconvenient for D.P.H. to respond to any legal claims in the courts in this state.

"What the Commonwealth mischaracterizes as 'extreme limits on relevance' is, in fact, 'supported by common sense, sound policy, [and] case law.'  That 'common sense' consists of the notion that jurors are human beings, susceptible to strong emotions and feelings of sympathy and outrage. That 'sound policy' is grounded in the principle that, no matter how heinous the crime charged, the accused is to be presumed innocent, our system of justice is to afford due process of law to every citizen, and therefore the members of our community that judge must do so dispassionately, without the burden of inflammatory diversions and persistent appeals to sympathy and emotion by the government. That 'case law' is part of a long line of cases that uphold, and make real, the principle that in this Commonwealth a prosecutor is not permitted to 'unfairly invite[] the jury to be influenced in arriving at their verdict by sympathy' or emotion.

It is a simplistic view of American life to suppose that association with a space inside of a building can be equated with having possession of, and the intention and ability to exercise dominion and control over, all of the objects inside of it.

"The weakness of the Commonwealth’s evidence in this case is perhaps best summed up by the trial judge himself:

'There’s got to be a better way for the Commonwealth to prove boundaries than through the type of testimony we heard in this case, counsel. It does seem incredibly sloppy, and forgive me for saying so. And I realize you don’t have control over the police, perhaps, but there has got to be a better way than—than everybody trying to figure—guess where the end of the property is, and whether you make it or whether you don’t. I—I guess—change that to—you may have gotten the ball over the rail, but it was teetering perilously on the edge, just about ready to plop out if some slight breeze came along, perhaps, and rolled it over. That is the type of evidence that makes for appeals, and makes for bad decisions. There’s got to be some kind of town maps or city maps or something that you can get certified that tells you where the devil the boundaries of the property are. And—All right. … As loosey-goosey as the evidence is regarding where the boundary is, it seems to me the Commonwealth has, as I say, managed to—to get the ball into the—over the rail somehow on the basis of the testimony of the witnesses….'

Evidence that is “incredibly sloppy,” and consists of “everybody trying to guess where the end of the property is,” is not a sufficient basis upon which to deprive a man of his liberty. Evidence, characterized as “loosey-goosey” by the judge who listened to it, that is “teetering perilously on the edge, ready to plop out if some slight breeze came along,” and that got “over the rail somehow,” does not conform to due process of law. As a matter of law, the evidence in this case was insufficient to convict Peter Johnson of violating the school zone statute. In the interest of justice, his conviction must be reversed."

"The Commonwealth’s argument that the erroneous jury instruction in this case was of no consequence because it “did not relate to an actively contested issue at trial” is extremely troubling in its implications. Fundamental fairness in our criminal process should not give way to subjective judgments about “main” versus secondary theories of a case, or what might constitute an “actively” contested issue. Mr. Alves had a right, when placed at the bar of justice, to be convicted or acquitted of the crime charged as that crime is defined by law, not something less. Mr. Alves had a right to be found guilty only upon a finding that the proper elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the trial judge’s substantial error permitted Jose Alves to be tried, convicted and punished upon proof of something less than assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. Here, the Commonwealth was permitted to convict with less than proof of the elements of that charge, beyond a reasonable doubt. On this ground, Mr. Alves’ conviction should not stand."

"Officer Dolan observed Frank Macri for a brief period of time. During that time Frank Macri was engaged in commonplace, every day actions such as driving a car that broke down; stopping that car in a gas station parking lot away from moving traffic where it would remain until it was towed; getting out of that car; standing next to another car that was flagged down; returning to the car he was driving until a truck arrived; and then riding in the back of that truck to get back to Fall River.
Officer Dolan did not see Frank Macri engage in a drug transaction. Officer Dolan did not see Frank Macri hand anyone money. No drugs were recovered from Frank Macri; no indicia of drug dealing were recovered from, or associated with, Frank Macri. The Commonwealth presented no evidence of activity prior to the time Officer Dolan commenced his short-lived surveillance. There was no evidence of consciousness of guilt, or admissions by Frank Macri. Apart from the everyday, commonplace actions mentioned above, the Commonwealth was unable to present any evidence of an association between Frank Macri and Patricia Anstett who was in possession of drugs; or a plan, or scheme, of any kind, with any person.

The case at bar places directly before this Court the very basic, yet fundamental and far reaching question of what the due process command referred to by the United States Supreme Court requires before evidence can be considered sufficient to deprive a citizen of his liberty. The Commonwealth’s brief and the authorities cited therein confirm that the evidence in this case did not meet the threshold necessary to honor that command."